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as well as the prescribed remedies. We show that the ‘institutional sclerosis’ view of 
Germany’s stagnation is unfounded and that therefore the political measures proposed and 
actually taken are misguided. Instead, we claim that macroeconomic mismanagement explains 
the German absolute and relative stagnation compared with the Euro area as a whole and with 
the USA. If the problem of macroeconomic mismanagement is not addressed and solved, 
irrespective occasional cyclical upswings, we predict a continuing stagnation tendency for the 
German economy. And we argue that this is not only a German problem, but a matter of 
European concern, because the macroeconomic policies which have caused the German 
constellation will have major negative feedback effects on the other Euro area countries in the 
near future. 
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Germany’s economic performance with respect to GDP growth, the development of 
unemployment and also the budget deficit has been considerably worse than the Euro area 
average since the mid-1990s (Hein/Truger 2005a, 2005b). However, this relative economic 
weakness might have gone almost unnoticed if it had not been for the slowdown of the world 
economy after 2000. By the end of 2002 it had become obvious that Germany had been hit 
much harder by this slowdown and did not manage to recover. Unemployment rose for the 
first time above the Euro area average and the budget deficit exceeded the 3 percent limit of 
the European Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Soon talk of Germany as ‘Europe’s sick man’ 
began to spread. 
 
Now, more than five years after the beginning of the slowdown – and perhaps on the verge of 
an uncertain recovery –, the whole extent of the German crisis can be evaluated: Real GDP 
growth more or less stagnated from late 2001 to 2003. 2004 then saw a mild recovery with a 
growth rate of 1.6 percent, but in 2005 growth staggered again and came down to below 1 
percent. Unemployment rose to its post-war maximum. The budget deficit, though still not 
excessively high in international comparison, has been increasing despite strong consolidation 
efforts since 2001. In 2005 it has exceeded the 3 percent (of GDP) deficit limit of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) for the fourth time in four 
consecutive years. 
 
The economic crisis had serious consequences both for the economic policy debate and for 
economic policy itself. The debate that had been biased by a monetarist/new classical or 
simple supply side view, became even more radical. For most of the German – and to some 
extent also the international – mainstream economists, journalists and business lobbyists 
Germany seemed stuck in a deep ‘structural’ crisis caused by tightly regulated labour markets 
and an overly generous welfare state. In their view the long duration of the stagnation 
excluded cyclical, demand side factors as an explanation. Therefore, they recommended 
radical ‘structural’ reforms, i.e. a large scale deregulation of the labour market, a dismantling 
of the welfare state, together with an accelerated policy of fiscal consolidation by means of 
public expenditure cuts. 
   3  
The proponents of radical reforms have been politically successful: Six months after the 
beginning of the red-green government’s second term, Chancellor Schroeder’s ‘AGENDA 
2010’ presented in March 2003 has been the turning point towards the implementation of far 
reaching structural reforms to overcome the (perceived) institutional sclerosis (Schroeder 
2003). Above all the duration and the level of unemployment benefits have been drastically 
reduced by 2005 (‘Hartz IV’ laws). And in November 2005 the newly elected grand coalition 
government formed by the conservative party (CDU) and the social democrats (SPD) under 
chancellor Angela Merkel, has made it very clear that it is determined to continue the way of 
‘structural’ reforms and to tighten fiscal policy even further (Coalition contract 2005). 
 
In the present paper we question the mainstream diagnosis as well as the prescribed remedies. 
We show that the underlying ‘institutional sclerosis’ view of Germany’s stagnation is 
unfounded and that therefore the political measures proposed and actually taken are 
misguided. Instead, we claim that macroeconomic mismanagement explains the German 
absolute and relative stagnation compared with the Euro area as whole and with the USA. If 
the problem of macroeconomic mismanagement is not addressed and solved, irrespective 
occasional cyclical upswings, we predict a continuing stagnation tendency for the German 
economy. And we argue that this is not only a German problem, but a matter of European 
concern: The macroeconomic policies which have caused the German constellation might 
have major negative feedback effects on the other Euro area countries in the near future. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the facts to be explained, namely the 
different economic performances of Germany, the Euro area as a whole and the USA after the 
economic slowdown in 2000/2001 to 2005. Section 3 sketches ‘institutional sclerosis’ and a 
lack of ‘structural reforms’ as the dominant mainstream explanation and shows that it cannot 
be reconciled with the standard empirical indicators for institutional sclerosis. Section 4 
presents our macroeconomic policy explanation and demonstrates that macroeconomic 
mismanagement of the post-2000 slowdown is the key to understand the prolonged German 
stagnation. Section 5 concentrates on recent disinflationary developments in German wage 
policy and the danger of deflation in the near future. It shows why that danger might spread 
all over Europe. Section 6 gives some economic policy conclusions and a rather pessimistic 
outlook.   4  
2. Germany’s stagnation since 2000/2001 
 
During the recent years the Euro area as a whole has been facing serious economic problems 
and has been doing considerably worse than the USA.
1 But in comparison to the Euro area as 
a whole Germany’s performance has been even worse since the mid 1990s (Figure 1), and 
Germany has been hit much harder by the economic slowdown in 2000/2001 (Table 1). 
During the period 2001-2005 average annual GDP growth in Germany has amounted to only 
0.7 percent which was only half of the Euro area growth of 1.4 percent. 
 
Figure 1: Real GDP growth in Germany, the Euro area 
and the USA, 1992-2005, in percent
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In contrast to the entire Euro area, Germany’s weak growth is completely driven by export 
surpluses. The contribution of domestic demand to GDP growth has been negative on average 
over this period. Whereas private and public consumption in real terms have almost stagnated 
during the period 2001-2005, private and public investment have decreased and have 
negatively contributed to GDP growth. Without the huge growth contribution of export 
surpluses which amounted to 1 percentage point per year on average, Germany would not 
only face a period of stagnation but would suffer from a deep recession. Taken together, 
Germany’s economy has performed very well on international markets and has gained 
                                                 
1 See Hein/Niechoj (2006) and Hein/Truger (2005a, 2005b) for a detailed analysis of the long run trends and the 
macroeconomic policy causes for the differences between the countries or currency areas referred to above.   5  
considerable export surpluses in the period 2001-2005, but has suffered from weak domestic 
demand (Table 1 and Figure 2). 
 
Table 1: Real GDP growth, growth contributions of demand aggregates, unemployment 
rate and inflation rate, in Germany, the Euro area and the USA, average values for 
2001-2005* 
 Germany  Euro  area  USA 
Real GDP, annual growth rate, percent  0.7  1.4  2.6 
Growth contribution of domestic demand including 
stocks, percentage points  -0.3  1.3  3.0 
Growth contribution of private consumption, 
percentage points  0.2  0.8  2.2 
Growth contribution of public consumption, 
percentage points  0.0  0.3  0.5 
Growth contribution of gross fixed capital 
formation, percentage points  -0.4 0.1 0.4 
Growth contribution of balance of goods and 
services, percentage points  1.0  0.1  -0.5 
Employment, annual growth, percent  -0.1  0.8  0.7 
Unemployment rate, percent   8.7  8.5  5.4 
Inflation rate (Germany, Euro area: HCPI, USA: 
national CPI), percent  1.6  2.2  2.5 
Notes: *Forecast values for 2005 
Source: European Commission (2005), OECD (2005a), authors’ calculations 
 
Between 2001-2005 GDP growth in the Euro area has been higher than in Germany but more 
than 1 percentage point per year below US growth. The growth contribution of external 
demand is positive but low. The USA has done well after the recession of 2000/1 and seems 
to have returned to the growth path of the second half of the 1990s. It is completely relying on 
domestic demand with external demand contributing negatively to real GDP growth. As in the 
1990s, US investors and, in particular, US consumers, supported by public expenditures on 
investment and consumption, are again the world demand locomotive. 
   6  
Figure 2: Growth contribution of domestic demand, 
including stocks, in Germany, the Euro area and the 
USA, 1992-2005, in percentage points
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The willingness of the USA to spend beyond their means has been a welcomed source of 
world demand and has contributed to a quick recovery of the world economy from the 2000/1 
growth slowdown. But the associated world imbalances, in particular the enormous US 
current account deficit and the rising indebtedness of US private households, question the 
sustainability of this constellation.
2
 
Because of weak growth, German employment has even shrunken during the period 2001-
2005, whereas employment in the Euro area and in the USA has increased by 0.8 and 0.7 
percent per year. Therefore, German unemployment which had always been below the Euro 
area average until 2002 now exceeds this average. The unemployment rate in the Euro area is 
still more than 3 percentage points higher than in the USA (Figure 3). Inflation in Germany is 
well below the Euro area average, as it has been since the mid 1990s (Figure 4). And Euro 
area inflation is slightly below US inflation.  
                                                 
2 See for a discussion Godley et al. (2005) and Papadimitriou et al. (2005, 2006).   7  
Figure 3: Unemployment rate in Germany, the Euro 
area and the USA, 1992-2005, percent
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Figure 4: Inflation rate (Consumer price index) in 
Germany, the Euro area and the USA, 1992-2005, 
percent 
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Taken together, the development following the 2000/1 growth slowdown has made clear that 
Germany, the former key currency country of the European Monetary System (EMS) has 
indeed become ‘Europe’s sick man’. This is not due to a loss of international competitiveness   8  
but rather to stagnating domestic demand. The reasons for this constellation remain to be 
explained. 
 
3. The mainstream interpretation: lack of structural reforms 
 
For most of the German – and to a somewhat lesser extent also the international – economics 
profession, the analysis of the German growth and employment problem is clear and simple: 
Institutional sclerosis, i.e. rigid and over-regulated labour markets and too generous welfare 
state institutions have driven Germany into crisis. This institutional sclerosis view is based on 
simple neoclassical labour market theory. With a complete and perfect neoclassical labour 
market as standard of reference unemployment can only arise because of market 
imperfections preventing a market clearing real wage at full employment (Siebert 1997). 
Institutions of collective wage bargaining (unions and employers’ associations on the 
regional, sectoral or national level), labour market regulation (e.g. employment protection 
legislation, minimum wages) and the welfare state (unemployment benefits, social benefits 
and the ‘tax wedge’) are seen as creators of unemployment. From this theoretical point of 
view there is only one remedy to get the German economy going again and to fight 
unemployment: Reduce the imperfections of the labour market, i.e. impede collective 
bargaining, deregulate the labour market and dismantle the welfare state as far as possible. 
This is exactly the message that has been repeated over and over again by most of the national 
and international economic experts in recent years.
3
 
We have argued elsewhere (Hein/Truger 2005a, 2005b) that the institutional sclerosis view in 
general suffers from serious deficiencies with respect to both its theoretical as well as its 
empirical foundations. What is even more important in the particular German case is that the 
empirical conditions for deriving an institutional sclerosis explanation of its absolute and 
relative economic weakness are hardly ever verified. On the contrary, most mainstream 
economists simply assume that there must be institutional sclerosis in Germany without even 
bothering to find any direct empirical support for that assumption. Instead they seem to rely 
on indirect ‘evidence’. For example the German council of economic experts (SVR 2005) as 
well as the major research institutes (Institute 2004: 665-668.) decompose the economic data 
                                                 
3 See for instance the annual reports of the German council of economic experts (SVR 2003, 2004, 2005), the 
majority view in the semi-annual joint reports of the leading economic research institutes in Germany (Institute 
2003, 2004, 2005) and, in particular, an economic policy paper by the German central bank (Deutsche 
Bundesbank 2003). The OECD and IMF reports on the German and European economy also aim at structural 
reforms (IMF 2006, OECD 2005a). The same is true for the European Commission (2002).   9  
into a trend and a cyclical component with the help of modern time series econometrics. As 
trend growth has come down rather drastically as a result of Germany’s prolonged stagnation 
in recent years, they ‘observe’ that long-term ‘potential’ growth has decreased and that ‘long-
term’ ‘structural’ unemployment has risen, whereas the importance of the ‘short-term’ 
‘cyclical’ component has decreased. Being strong believers in simple neoclassical labour 
market theory or simplistic NAIRU (Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment) 
approaches, they therefore conclude that only ‘structural’ factors can be responsible for the 
long-term difficulties of the economy. Hence, they conclude that a lack of structural reforms 
both in absolute terms and in comparison with other ‘more successful countries’ must be 
responsible for Germany’s crisis. As a corollary they also conclude that macroeconomic 
policies cannot explain Germany’s stagnation, as they are only ‘short term’ in nature and can 
only influence the cyclical component which has been identified as being of minor importance 
before. Therefore, the mainstream experts see no serious problem in the ECB’s monetary 
policy and they propose much more ambitious fiscal consolidation efforts to the German 
government. They are confident that ‘short-term’ negative demand effects of monetary or 
fiscal policy can not do much harm, as they simply see no serious demand-side problems in 
Germany. Symmetrically they do not believe that monetary or fiscal expansion can be very 
helpful in getting Germany out of its stagnation. 
 
What happens, however, if one looks for direct evidence on institutional sclerosis in 
Germany? In order to convincingly apply the institutional sclerosis explanation to Germany’s 
current economic crisis it would have to be verified, that German labour market and welfare 
state institutions have taken an unfavourable path both over time and in international 
comparison. The supposed ‘lack of reforms’ should be observable somewhere in the data. As 
we have demonstrated in greater detail elsewhere (Hein/Truger 2005a; 2005b), using the set 
of six institutional indicators (index of employment protection, benefit replacement rate, 
benefit duration, union density, bargaining coordination and tax wedge) compiled by Baker et 
al. (2004), this is not the case. Table 2 presents the most important results for our present 
purpose in a nutshell. It shows the total indicator of institutional sclerosis for Germany, the 
OECD, the European Union, the Euro-Area and the United States we calculated from the set 
of six single indicators for the first half of the 1980s and the second half of the 1990s. Higher 
values indicate higher levels of institutional sclerosis. Focussing first on Germany alone, it 
can easily be seen, that within the covered 20 year period, it has succeeded in reducing its 
institutional sclerosis by about 5 percentage points from 57 to 52. Obviously, in contrast to   10  
popular wisdom, there has been a considerable reform activity. This becomes even more 
striking in international comparison, where Germany seems to have outperformed the OECD, 
EU, Euro-Area and the US with respect to reform activity: The average total indicator for the 
OECD, the EU and the US has been reduced by only 2 percentage points, the Euro-area 
average has even risen by 1 percentage point. Starting from above average values, by the end 
of the 1990s Germany had managed to bring down its level of institutional sclerosis to the 
average EU level and even below the Euro-Area average. Of course it still cannot ‘compete’ 
with the free-market USA. 
 
Table 2: Total indicator of institutional sclerosis* 1980-84 and 1995-99 
  1980-84 1995-99 
Germany  57 52 
OECD
# 49 47 
European Union
§ 53 52 
Euro area
§ 52 53 
USA  20 18 
* Arithmetic mean of six single indicators for employment protection legislation, benefit replacement rate, 
benefit duration, union density, bargaining coordination and the tax wedge previously scaled to the interval [0; 
100]. An exact definition and a documentation of the origin of the data is given by Nickell et. al. (2002) and 
Baker et. al. (2004). A more detailed presentation of the German data in international comparison is given in 
Hein/Truger (2005a). 
# Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA. 
§ without Greece and Luxemburg. 
Source: Baker et al. (2004), authors’ calculations 
 
One might of course question the importance of rather favourable indicators from the late 
1990s for Germany’s current economic performance. German institutions might simply have 
become more sclerotic in the meantime. Although there is no complete data set comparable to 
that of Baker et al. (2004) for the more recent past, there are strong indications that there has 
been no reversal of the reform trend in Germany. The analysis by Mabbett/Schelkle (2005) on 
the basis of the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti Social Reforms Data Base (Fondazione 
2005) shows, that at least for employment protection legislation and the system of 
unemployment benefits, the earlier reform trend has continued until 2002. Table 3 displays 
indicators summarising the intensity of welfare state reform with respect to employment 
protection and unemployment benefits for 14 EU countries in the period 1986-2002 divided 
into two sub-periods. Positive (negative) values indicate a decrease (increase) in institutional 
sclerosis. As can easily be seen, Germany had a rather ‘bad start’ during the first sub-period 
1986-1994, when welfare state institutions slightly ‘worsened’, whereas most of the other 
countries ‘improved’ them by small amounts. However, in the second period 1995-2002   11  
Germany ‘improved’ its welfare state institutions by 17 points – more than any other country 
except for the Netherlands. Of course, for the very recent past from 2003 onwards a trend 
reversal might still be a theoretical possibility. This is almost impossible, however, since in 
2003 the former red-green government started its ‘Agenda 2010’ which has been praised by 
most mainstream economists as an important step forward on the way of structural reforms. 
 
Table 3: Intensity of welfare state reform
1) in 14 EU countries 
 1987-1994  1995-2002  1987-2002 
Austria  -1 13 12 
Belgium  5 7  12 
Denmark  4 10  14 
Finland  4 16  20 
France  -3 -12  -15 
Germany  -2 17 15 
Greece  0 9 9 
Ireland  5 3 8 
Italy  1 13  14 
Netherlands  2 24  26 
Portugal  0 -3 -3 
Spain  5 0 5 
Sweden  4 15  19 
United Kingdom  5 5  10 
1) Sum of the two single reform intensity values assigned by Mabbett/Schelkle (2005), i.e. the sum of reform 
intensity values of reform measures in employment protection and non-employment benefits for each country in 
the relevant period, on the basis of the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti Social Reforms database (Fondazione 
2005). A plus indicates ‘increasing flexibility’ (making systems less protective or generous). A minus indicates 
‘decreasing flexibility’ (making systems more protective or generous). Mabbett/Schelkle (2005) measure the 
intensity of any reform package by assigning a value of ±1 to reform measures the database classifies as 
‘marginal’ and ±2 to those classified as ‘structural’. Reform packages containing a series of measures get an 
intensity value of 2 if they contain two or more marginal measures and an additional 2 for including a structural 
measure (so ±4 is the maximum for the intensity of any one reform package, ±2 if it contains only marginal 
measures). 
Source: Fondazione (2005), Mabbett/Schelkle (2005), authors’ calculations
 
 
In the face of this evidence it is difficult to understand how the overwhelming majority of 
national and international economists can still cling to the myth of extraordinary institutional 
sclerosis and a lack of structural reforms in Germany. In comparison with the Euro area 
average the indicators prove that Germany is less sclerotic and has shown above average 
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4. Another view: macroeconomic mismanagement 
 
4.1 On the relevance of macroeconomic policy coordination for growth and employment 
 
A macroeconomic-policy story of Germany’s slump can both rely on Post-Keynesian as well 
as on New Keynesian approaches.
4 In those two modern Keynesian views monetary, fiscal 
and wage policies have a common responsibility for employment and price stability. In order 
to attain these goals the three policies have to be coordinated at least at the national,
5 better 
even at the international level, in particular in currency unions with a common monetary 
policy. 
 
In the Post-Keynesian approach the development of aggregate demand determines growth and 
employment in the short as well as in the long run.
6 Monetary policy’s interest rate setting and 
firms’ profit expectations essentially affect private investment which in turn is an essential 
determinant of effective demand and macroeconomic growth. Fiscal policy is also a central 
short and long run determinant of aggregate demand working both through the tax and the 
expenditure channel, in particular through public investment. And it is effective demand 
which via the level of aggregate output determines the level of employment realised in the 
labour market. The labour market, in this view, is a derived market because wage setting has 
no direct influence on employment. Instead, employment is determined by the interaction of 
the financial market where the interest rate is set – mainly by the policies of the central bank – 
and the goods market where total output is determined. Nominal wages set by labour unions 
and employers’ associations, however, are the crucial determinant of the price level and 
inflation: With labour productivity given or following an exogenous trend and mark-up 
pricing in incomplete goods markets, the nominal wage rate determines the price level when 
the mark-ups are constant. Whereas monetary and fiscal policies are capable of affecting 
effective demand and hence employment, wage policies are in charge of preventing 
cumulative inflation as well as deflation. Therefore, rigid wages have to provide the nominal 
anchor for the whole system of a monetary production economy. 
 
                                                 
4 See Snowdon/Vane/Wynarczyk (1994: 286-330, 367-380) for textbook reviews of the two approaches. 
5 A lot of papers have shown that a favourable coordination between monetary and fiscal policies rather than 
deregulated labour markets can be held responsible for the superior development of the US-economy during the 
1990s compared to Germany or the European economies (Fritsche et al. 2005, Hein/Niechoj 2006, Palley 1998, 
Solow 2000). 
6 See Davidson (1994), Heine/Herr (1999) and Lavoie (1992) for textbook presentations of the Post-Keynesian 
approach and Arestis (1996) for a survey.   13  
In New Keynesian economics effective demand and hence monetary and fiscal policies have 
at least a short run impact on production and employment because prices and wages are 
assumed to adjust rather slowly to their long-run equilibrium values.
7 In the long run 
equilibrium, however, unemployment is determined by the NAIRU, which may depend on 
those structural factors discussed in Section 3. In the short run, however, the exact duration of 
which is not clear, but which may be assumed to last at least a few years (Blanchard, 2003, p. 
34), effective demand determines production and employment. From this it follows, that 
mainstream New Keynesian implications for monetary and fiscal policies in the short run are 
rather similar to the Post-Keynesian approach: Monetary and fiscal policies are capable of 
stimulating demand and employment when the economy is in a slump and unemployment 
exceeds the NAIRU. Utmost importance is assigned as well to the coordination of the two 
policies by some authors (Blanchard 2003: 101-4, 431-2).
8
 
With respect to wage policies, however, the New Keynesian analysis differs substantially 
from the Post-Keynesian approach. In the short run, wage policy is strictly speaking not even 
a policy variable, because the short run is defined by exogenous and/or sticky nominal wages. 
And in the long run, wage policy is completely endogenous because mainstream models 
assume nominal wages adapting to the level consistent with the NAIRU (Blanchard 2003: 
113-33). In contrast to the Post-Keynesian view, nominal wage moderation can be an 
effective way to accelerate the reduction of actual unemployment to the NAIRU-level. In 
New Keynesian models, however, it is not clear how effective demand determining 
unemployment in the short run can adjust to the level of production associated with the 
NAIRU in the long run.
9 In order to have increasing effective demand when nominal wages 
and prices are falling in the face of unemployment above the NAIRU, either a real-balance-
effect has to be assumed. This requires the dominance of exogenous or outside money which 
is not the case in modern monetary production economies. Or, if we assume the dominance of 
endogenous money coming into existence via credit creation, symmetric monetary policy 
interventions are required (Allsopp/Vines 1998). These may, however, not be sufficient to 
increase demand and employment when profit expectations are depressed and debt-deflation 
                                                 
7 See Auerbach/Kotlikoff (1998), Blanchard (2003), Mankiw (2002) and Stiglitz (1997) for textbook 
presentations in the New Keynesian vain and Truger (2003) for a survey of macroeconomic policy implications. 
8 The requirement of coordinated monetary and fiscal policy intervention increases considerably if hysteresis is 
taken into account. With hysteresis the NAIRU is no longer exogenous for macro-economic policies but rather 
depends on the past development of the actual unemployment rate which can be affected by macro-policies (Ball 
1999, Blanchard 2003: 283, Blanchard/Summers 1987, 1988). 
9 For a critique of the New Keynesian NAIRU approach from a Post-Keynesian perspective see Arestis/Sawyer 
(2004: 73-99), Sawyer (2001, 2002), Stockhammer (2004) and Hein (2002, 2004, 2005).   14  
works its way through the private sector. Because of these considerations we prefer the Post-
Keynesian view of rigid nominal wages as a macroeconomic stabiliser rather than the New 
Keynesian view of nominal wages as an adjustment variable to the long-run equilibrium. 
 
 
4.2 Restrictive and ill-coordinated macroeconomic policies in Germany 
 
In order to provide a macroeconomic policy explanation for Germany’s recent stagnation, it 
has to be shown that since 2001 monetary, fiscal and wage policies for Germany have indeed 
been less favourable than for the Euro area average or for the USA (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Indicators for monetary, wage and fiscal policies in Germany, the Euro area, 
and the USA, average values, 2001-2005* 
  Germany Euro  area  USA 
Monetary Policy     
Short-term real interest rate, percent  1.2  0.6  -0.2 
Long-term real interest rate, percent  2.6  2.1  1.9 
Short-term real interest rate minus real GDP growth, 
percentage points  0.5  -0.8  -2.7 
Long-term real interest rate minus real GDP growth, 
percentage points  1.9  0.7  -0.7 
     
Fiscal Policy     
Budget balance (percent of GDP)  -3.6  -2.6  -3.5 
Cyclically adjusted budget balance (percent of cyclical 
adjusted GDP), annual change, percentage points  -0.1  -0.1  -0.9 
Output gap, (percent of cyclical adjusted GDP), annual 
change, percentage points  -0.8  -0.6  -0.3 
Number of years with pro-cyclical fiscal policy during 







Negative fiscal stimulus in economic slowdown, 
cumulated (percent of potential GDP)  1.1  0.5  -- 
     
Wage Policy     
Nominal compensation per employee, annual growth, 
percent 1.7  2.5  4.0 
Nominal unit labour costs, annual growth, percent  0.3  1.7  1.7 
Labour income share
#, percent  58.1  58.0  62.6 
Change in labour income share to previous year, 
percentage points  -0.5  -0.2  -0.4 
Notes: *Forecast values for 2005, 
#compensation per employee divided by GDP at current market prices per 
person employed 
Sources: European Commission (2005), OECD (2005a), authors’ calculations 
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Monetary policy 
 
Monetary policy will be assessed by the development of the short-term real interest rate. It is 
now widely accepted that modern central banks use the short-term nominal interest rate as an 
economic policy instrument. But if central banks target inflation they have to set nominal 
interest rates with an eye to the ensuing real rate, as it is proposed in the famous Taylor-rule 
for example (Taylor 1993). In order to take into account the underlying economic situation, 
we consult the differences between the short-term real interest rate and real GDP-growth and 
also the difference between the long-term real interest rate and real GDP-growth. We expect a 
negative influence of real interest rates on economic growth working through different 
transmission channels (money, credit, asset prices, exchange rates) (Bernanke/Gertler 1995, 
Cecchetti 1995). 
 
With respect to monetary policies, Germany has lost its former status as the key currency 
country within the European Monetary System (EMS) at the start of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) in 1999. Since then it has no longer been in a position to reap the advantages of 
lower interest rates it used to have compared to the other EMS countries. During the process 
of convergence these countries gained from a considerable decrease of short- and long-term 
nominal interest rates towards the lower German level. This convergence and decrease in 
nominal interest rates was associated with a stronger decrease in real interest rates for the 
other Euro area countries than for Germany over the 1990s. And this has been conducive to 
relative growth in these countries and has established a more favourable real interest rate-real 
GDP growth relation compared to Germany since the mid 1990s (Figure 5). In the USA 
monetary policies have even been more conducive to growth with a negative short-term 
interest rate-real GDP growth-difference almost throughout since the early 1990s.   16  
Figure 5: Short-term real interest rate minus real GDP 
growth in Germany, the Euro area and the USA, 
1992-2005, percentage points 


































































Germany Euro area USA
 
 
As the German inflation rate has been lower than the Euro area average and the nominal 
interest rates have almost completely converged since 1999, Germany’s real interest rates 
have even been higher than the Euro area average since then. On average over the period 
2001-2005 the ECB policies generated a short-term real interest rate of 1.2 percent in 
Germany which was now twice as high as in the Euro area as whole with 0.6 percent. 
Whereas the Euro area short-term real interest rate was positive on average over the period 
after the 2000/1 growth slowdown, the Federal Reserve managed to establish a negative short-
term real interest rate of -0.2 percent in the USA. These expansionary monetary policies 
contributed to the quick recovery of the US economy. Already in 2002 the USA saw again – 
as in the years before 2001 – a negative short-term real interest rate-real GDP growth rate-
difference, whereas in the Euro area this difference became negative only in 2003 and in 
Germany only in 2004 (Figure 5). On average over the recent years, the Fed established a 
favourable short-term real interest rate-real GDP growth-difference (-2.7 percentage points), 
and also a growth-friendly long-term real interest rate-real GDP growth constellation (-0.7 
percentage points). The ECB has been much more reluctant to stimulate the economy by 
means of cutting interest rates in the face of the 2000/1 slowdown and has thereby contributed 
to weak growth in the Euro area, and particularly in Germany since then. Whereas on average 
over the period 2001-2005 in the Euro area as a whole the short-term real interest rate-real 
GDP growth-difference has been at least slightly negative (-0.8 percentage point), in Germany 
this difference has even been positive (0.5 percentage points). And the long-term real interest   17  
rate-real GDP growth-difference has been positive in the Euro area as whole (0.7 percentage 
points) with the German value (1.9 percentage points) exceeding the Euro area average by a 
considerable amount. 
 
Therefore, Germany has not only suffered from European monetary integration loosing the 
interest rate advantage it has enjoyed before but it has also, in particular, suffered from the 
ECB’s ‘anti-growth bias’ since 1999. This consists of a too restrictive definition of price 
stability for the heterogeneous currency area – as an annual increase of the harmonised 
consumer price index of below but close to 2 percent (ECB 2003: 89) – and an asymmetric 
response to the expected deviation of actual from target inflation.
10 Germany’s weak 
performance since 2000/1, however, is only partly caused by the ECB’s monetary strategy. It 
is also due to the fact that within the monetary union, the ECB can only address average 
inflation and cannot take into account Germany’s special economic situation with both a 





As the ECB was neither willing nor able to take a more active part in stabilising the German 
economy after 2000, German national fiscal policy should have taken over the responsibility 
to counteract the macroeconomic shock. However, German fiscal policy did exactly the 
opposite by switching to a policy of pro-cyclical budget consolidation, thereby further 
worsening the crisis. On the one hand this was certainly attributable to political pressure 
imposed by the SGP, because Germany kept on exceeding the 3 percent limit for the deficit-
GDP-ratio. On the other hand, it is highly probable that mainstream policy advice of the sort 
described in section 3 of this paper did also play an important role. As can be seen from Table 
4, the German budget deficit over the period 2001-2005 averaged 3.6 percent of GDP, leading 
many professional observers to believe that fiscal policy was useless, as permanently ‘high’ 
deficits seemingly were not able to make the German economy recover. However, such 
reasoning is obviously simplistic. It ignores the fact that high or even growing deficits may 
well be the result of an economic slump rather than an indicator of active fiscal policy. 
                                                 
10 The ECB has tended to tighten whenever inflation increased above the target without relaxing when inflation 
expectations came down. For a general critique of the ECB’s ‘anti-growth bias’ see Bibow (2002, 2005a, 2005b) 
and Hein (2002).   18  
Therefore Tables 4 and 5 present some more adequate indicators for the macroeconomic 
impact of fiscal policy. 
 
The extent to which fiscal policy exerts a stabilising or destabilising influence on the business 
cycle can be assessed by comparing changes in the output gap and the cyclically adjusted 
budget balance-potential GDP ratio (CBR).
11 The output gap serves as an indicator of the 
current state of economic activity. If it is positive, then capacity is outstripped, if it is 
negative, this means that capacity is not fully utilised. Consequently, a positive change in the 
output gap indicates a cyclical upturn, whereas a negative change points to a cyclical 
downturn. If there is a positive (negative) change in the CBR, then structural deficits fall (rise) 
or structural surpluses rise (fall), and fiscal policy provides a restrictive (expansive) stimulus 
to demand. If the CBR remains constant when there is a change in the output gap, then fiscal 
policy is neither expansive nor restrictive and the automatic stabilisers are simply left to take 
effect.  
 
Measured in this way, German fiscal policy from 2001-2005 has been restrictive in three 
years in the face of a slowdown in economic activity, destabilising the economy and pro-
cyclically worsening the crisis. The cumulative negative fiscal stimulus from this pro-cyclical 
policy amounted to 1.1 percent of potential GDP over the whole period, acting as a substantial 
brake for the recovery. For the Euro area as a whole fiscal policy was pro-cyclically 
restrictive, too. However, the negative fiscal stimulus amounted to only 0.5 percent. So, 
despite the fact that the economic slowdown was considerably worse in Germany than in the 
Euro area as a whole (0.8 percentage points average annual fall in the output gap as compared 
to 0.6 percentage points in the Euro area), German fiscal policy was more restrictive. In 
striking contrast to the European practice, US fiscal policy acted as a strong counter-cyclical 
stabiliser: During the observation period there has not been a single year in which US fiscal 
                                                 
11 Of course, such cyclically adjusted measures can be criticised for a number of theoretical and empirical 
reasons and should therefore be interpreted with great care. Theoretically they are very close to the idea 
embedded in the standard NAIRU models that there is a long run equilibrium determined by structural 
characteristics of the labour market which is independent of the short run fluctuations generated by demand 
shocks or macroeconomic policy. We do not share this view. Empirically these measures are very sensitive to the 
exact method used and to the choice of observation period. Despite these serious problems with the measures we 
consider them as useful. Even more: If it can be shown that certain empirical findings about the stabilising or 
destabilising effects of fiscal policy can be derived even within such a mainstream framework, then this 
strengthens the point from a heterodox perspective. Of course, the results for a given set of countries and a given 
time period should be more or less robust to the method used and to additional observations due to new data over 
time. In order to ensure the first, in this paper we did some sensitivity analysis with regard to three different 
methods. With regard to the latter most of the results have proven to be very robust to new data, as we conducted 
this kind of analysis with almost every new edition of the OECD Economic Outlook data since 2001 (see 
Hein/Muelhaupt/Truger 2001, Hein/Truger 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, Truger/Hein 2002).   19  
policy reduced the CBR in the face of an economic slowdown. Quite the opposite, it boosted 
the US economy by reducing the CBR by 0.9 percentage points of potential GDP on average 
over the last five years. In both the Euro area and Germany the stimulus was only 0.1 
percentage points on average.
12
 
The restrictive and destabilising impact of German fiscal policy becomes even more obvious 
if one considers the growth rates of some fiscal policy aggregates in more detail (Table 5). 
Public expenditure growth has been weak, all the relevant numbers being far below average 
real GDP growth of 0.7 percent. Real total public expenditure actually declined by an annual 
average of -0.2 percent. Real public final consumption stagnated and public investment 
declined dramatically by an annual 3.7 percent leading to an historically low average share of 
public investment in GDP of only 1.5 percent (1.3 percent in 2005). The latter development is 
particularly distressing as public investment is not only an essential component of aggregate 
demand in the short run, but also a provider of public infrastructure making it a key condition 
for growth in the long run. Expenditure growth has not only been weak in absolute terms but 
also in comparison with the Euro area and the USA. The corresponding average expenditure 
growth rates for the Euro are in the range between 1.4 and 1.8 percent and therefore rather 
well in line with or even slightly above average real GDP growth. The same is true for the 
USA where all the relevant expenditure growth rates are above 3 percent. In both the USA 
and the Euro area with an average 2.7
13 and 2.5 percent of GDP respectively the level of 




                                                 
12 Our results have been derived using the cyclically adjusted data and output gaps estimated by the OECD 
(2005a). As these estimates are considerably different from the two alternative estimates published by the 
European Commission (2005) based on a potential and a trend approach for Germany and the Euro area (there is 
no estimate for the USA), we checked whether our results still hold for these data. Qualitatively the results do 
hold, only the number of years with destabilising fiscal policy is reduced from three to two and the extent of the 
negative cumulative fiscal stimuli for both Germany and the Euro area are considerably lower. 
13 In some of the earlier papers which we authored or one of us co-authored (Hein/Truger 2005d, Hein/Niechoj 
2006) we displayed a substantially higher share of public investment for the USA well above 3 percent. The 
difference is exclusively due to different data sources. The OECD Economic Outlook which was used in the 
earlier papers has data received from the BEA (OECD 2005b: 70). The European Commission data which we 
used for the present paper subtracts the item ‘gross investment national defense’ from the primary US data, and 
adds it to government final consumption, hence the difference. This also has a visible effect on the growth rates 
of public consumption and investment calculated in Table 4. With the OECD data the growth rate of public 
investment would be higher by about 0.4 percentage points, those of public consumption would be lower by 
about 0.3 percentage points. We are grateful to Antonis Avdoulos and Noël Doyle from the European 
Commission for the statistical information.   20  
Table 5: Annual growth rates of selected fiscal policy aggregates in Germany, the Euro 
area, and the USA, average values, 2001-2005* in percent 
  Germany Euro  area  USA 
Real total government expenditure
# -0.2 1.4 3.6 
Real government final consumption expenditure  0.0  1.8  3.1 
Real government gross fixed capital formation
## -3.7 1.5 3.1 
Real government total revenue
# -1.4 0.6 0.3 
Gross fixed government capital formation (percent of 
GDP) 1.5  2.5  2.7 
Notes: *Forecast values for 2005; 
# deflated with the (harmonised) consumer price index;
 ## deflated with the 
deflator of total fixed capital formation. 
Sources: European Commission (2005), authors’ calculations 
 
Another striking feature of German fiscal policy over the last five years has been the 
remarkable decrease of real total public revenue by 1.4 percent per year, whereas both the 
Euro area and the US had at least a slow positive revenue growth. In the absence of any tax 
policy measures one would expect the revenue side to be growing somewhat faster than GDP 
due to a progressive tax system. It should be noted that there is a link between fiscal policy 
and wage policy through the revenue generation process of the tax system. In Germany the 
process of revenue generation and therefore also the process of fiscal consolidation is harmed 
by the extremely moderate wage development owing to the progressive tax system and also to 
the fact that the German social security system is mainly financed by wage based 
contributions. 
 
Apart from such effects, the weak development of revenue in Germany and also the USA 
quite obviously reflects the effects of the substantial tax cuts by the former red-green 
government in Germany (Truger 2004, Truger/Jacoby 2004) and by the Bush administration 
in the USA. For Germany this, however, means that the small average expansionary effects of 
fiscal policy have almost exclusively come from the revenue side through tax cuts, while the 
expenditure side has been on a tight restrictive path. If one takes into account the fact that the 
usual empirical estimates for expenditure multipliers are about double the size of the tax 
multipliers (Arestis/Sawyer 2003), the German policy of fiscal consolidation additionally 
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Wage policy 
 
Wage policies can be assessed by nominal wage growth (compensation per employee), unit 
labour cost growth and the labour income share. Nominal wage setting affects unit labour cost 
growth and inflation. If nominal wages increase at a faster pace than productivity plus the 
price level do, unit labour cost growth and inflation will speed up.
14 This will cause real 
interest rates to fall and may make the central bank increase nominal interest rates in order to 
reach its inflation target. If nominal wages increase at a rate below the sum of productivity 
growth and inflation, unit labour cost growth will slow down and cause disinflation. Finally, 
deflation may be the consequence. Deflation causes increasing real interest rates and rising 
real debts with potentially negative effects on investment and growth.
15 If deflationary 
processes have started, monetary policies lowering interest rates may be ineffective. 
 
Wage policies, however, may not only affect prices, but may also change distribution if firms 
do not completely pass unit labour cost variations to prices. Under these conditions nominal 
wage moderation causes the labour income share to fall. Empirical analysis for Germany and 
the Euro area since the 1960s has indicated, that the development of unit labour costs affects 
the development of output prices (Hein/Schulten/Truger 2006). The adjustment of the 
inflation rate to nominal unit labour cost growth, however, is incomplete. Therefore, nominal 
wage moderation is also associated with a tendency of labour income shares to fall. 
Hypothetically, the effects of income shares on GDP growth are ambiguous (Bhaduri/Marglin 
1990). With the propensity to save out of wages falling short of the savings propensity out of 
profits, a falling labour income share means a cut-back in consumption demand and capacity 
utilisation with directly contractive effects on investment and GDP growth. A fall in labour 
income shares that is associated with nominal wage restraint would, on the other hand, 
improve international competitiveness and, therefore, stimulate demand for exports, 
investment and growth. With a slowdown in inflation, the central bank may also cut interest 
rates and stimulate investment and growth. Finally, a falling labour income share is associated 
with rising unit profits which may also improve investment and growth. Since the stimulating 
effects of wage moderation and declining labour income shares for investment and growth are 
rather indirect and uncertain, the direct and contractive effects will presumably dominate. And 
                                                 
14 See Arestis/Sawyer (2005) and Hein (2005) for recent post-Keynesian models of distribution conflict and 
inflation. 
15 See Hein (2005, 2006) for the integration of real debt effects into Kaleckian models of distribution and growth 
with conflict inflation.   22  
since nominal wage increases, which shift distribution in favour of labour income, will also 
trigger inflation and concomitant restrictive central bank interventions, nominal wage growth 
according to the sum of long-run productivity growth and inflation and hence constant labour 
income shares should be generally favourable conditions for growth. 
 
Figure 6: Nominal unit labour costs growth in Germany, 
the Euro area and the USA, 1992-2005, percent 
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Germany’s too moderate nominal wage increases are the major cause for the below average 
inflation rate. Since 1995 unit labour cost growth in Germany has undercut the Euro area 
average growth (Figure 6). This is due to overly moderate wage development in Germany. On 
average over the period 2001-2005 nominal compensation per employee has only increased 
by 1.7 percent per year (Table 3). Taking into account inflation (Table 1), this means that real 
compensation per employee has stagnated in Germany since 2001. In the Euro area as a whole 
nominal compensation per employee has increased at a faster pace (2.5 percent per year) and 
real compensation has at least slightly increased (0.3 percent per year). The USA has 
witnessed a much higher average rate of increase of nominal compensation per employee (4.0 
percent) and also of real compensation per employee (1.5 percent). Because of overly 
moderate wage increases nominal unit labour cost growth in Germany has on average   23  
between 2001-2005 amounted to 0.3 percent, whereas the Euro area as a whole, as well as the 
USA, have seen an average annual increase of 1.7 percent. 
 
Slower unit labour cost growth and lower inflation in Germany were also observed before 
European monetary integration when Germany’s absolute and relative economic performance 
was much better (Hein/Truger 2005a, 2005b). But then unit labour cost growth and the 
resulting low inflation rates were the basis for the Deutschmark’s status as the regional key 
currency within the EMS, allowing the German Bundesbank to set substantially lower 
nominal and actually real interest rates than in the other EMS countries. Since the beginning 
of the interest rate convergence process in the mid 1990s and with the completion of Euro 
area in 1999, however, lower inflation rates for Germany do no longer pay off in terms of 
lower interest rates. 
 
The overly moderate wage setting in Germany did not only cause below average inflation 
rates. This wage policy also contributed to the acceleration of a tendency of declining labour 
income shares which had already started in early 1980s and continued during the 1990s 
(Figure 7). This redistribution at the expense of labour has contributed to the weak 
development of domestic demand and hence to Germany’s weak performance, in particular 
since 2001 when the labour income share declined by 0.5 percentage points per annum. 
However, a declining labour income share trend can also be witnessed in the Euro area as a 
whole, but not in the USA since the early 1990s, so that on average over the period 2001-2005 
the labour income share in USA (62.6 percent) exceeded the labour income share in the Euro 
area (58.0 percent) and in Germany (58.1 percent) by more than 4 percentage points. 
Redistribution at the expense of labour can hence only add to the explanation of Germany’s 
relative performance compared with the USA but not compared with the rest of the Euro area. 
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Figure 7: Labour income share in Germany, the Euro 
area and the USA, 1992-2005, percent of GDP at market 
prices 
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On the other hand, moderate wage policies in Germany have improved price competitiveness 
and profitability of German firms which made German export surpluses almost quadruple 
between 2001 and 2005. But this extraordinary export performance was insufficient to 
compensate for the associated deficiencies in domestic demand, as has been shown above 
(Table 1). And since around 44 percent of German exports go to the Euro area, increasing 
German export surpluses cause major problems for the other Euro area countries: Whereas 
Germany has continuously increased its current account surplus, amounting to 4.1 percent of 
GDP in 2005, the other larger Euro area countries (France, Italy, Spain) are increasingly 
driven into current account deficits (Table 6). And also some of the smaller countries either 
see their surpluses decline (Belgium, Finland) or are not allowed to improve their huge 
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Table 6: Current account balances as a percentage of GDP in Euro area countries and 
the USA, 2001-2005 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Germany  0.2 2.3 2.2 3.8 4.1 
France  1.6 0.9 0.4 -0.4  -1.6 
Italy  -0.1 -0.8 -1.3 -0.9 -1.5 
Spain  -3.9 -3.3 -3.6 -5.3 -7.7 
       
Austria  -1.9 0.3 -0.5 0.3 -0.4 
Belgium  3.4 4.6 4.1 3.3 1.4 
Finland  7.2 7.6 3.8 5.3 3.5 
Greece  -8.1 -7.5 -7.2 -6.3 -7.0 
Ireland  -0.6 -1.0 0.0 -0.8 -1.5 
Netherlands  2.4 2.9 2.8 3.3 5.8 
Portugal  -8.4 -8.0 -0.9 -3.6 -6.7 
       
Euro area  0.1 0.7 0.3 0.5 -0.2 
USA  -3.8 -4.5 -4.7 -5.7 -6.5 
Source: OECD (2005a) 
 
A restrictive macroeconomic policy mix in Germany 
In sum, macroeconomic policy variables have indeed been less favourable in Germany than in 
the Euro area as a whole and in the USA since 2001, as it has already been the case since the 
mid 1990s (Hein/Truger 2005a, 2005b). Macroeconomic mismanagement, therefore, can be 
considered to be the main cause of Germany’s stagnation. This is partly due to the integration 
of a former key currency country into a monetary union and the associated loss of the interest 
rate advantage, and is insofar inevitable. But it is also caused by the restrictive 
macroeconomic policy mix implemented at the Euro area level, which is particularly affecting 
a slowly growing low inflation country like Germany: the too restrictive ECB monetary 
policy strategy and the SGP enforcing a restrictive stance on the member countries’ fiscal 
policies. And a major contribution to macroeconomic mismanagement has come from 
German wage developments, which seems to be completely inappropriate for the largest 
economy in a monetary union. 
 
5. German wage development: an increasingly severe problem for Germany and for the 
Euro area 
 
One of the key problems derived in the previous section is Germany’s below Euro area 
average inflation rate. Below average inflation has been caused by below average growth of 
compensation per employee and hence below average unit labour cost growth which was not   26  
(and could not be directly) rewarded by the ECB’s monetary policy. This has meant that 
German households and firms have had to pay above Euro area average real interest rates 
since 1999 and the German economy has been particularly hit by the too restrictive stance of 
the ECB monetary policy strategy, in particular since 2001. And overly moderate wage 
increases and too low inflation have also contributed to the budget deficit problems and the 
inability to stick to the deficit criteria of the SGP. 
 
The particularly low wage increases in Germany compared to the Euro area average can be 
attributed to the following reasons (Table 7):
16
First, there has been a lessening of the trade unions’ bargaining power. Since 1996 trade 
unions’ collective bargaining policy has been plunged into a major crisis, they have been 
forced to accept collectively agreed wage increases of below 3 percent and 2004 and 2005 
even below 2 percent. The Euro area as a whole has also seen a decline in the growth of 
collectively agreed wages which has come down to slightly above 2 percent recently. 
Second, wage trends in Germany since the mid 1990s have been mainly characterized by a 
negative wage drift. In particular since 2002 actual earnings have been growing even more 
slowly than collectively agreed wages. In the Euro area as a whole there is still a positive but 
declining wage drift. 
 
Table 7: Collectively agreed wages, actual earning and wage drift in Germany and the 
Euro area, 2001-2005 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Germany       
1. Collectively agreed wages per employee 
hour, annual increase, percent 
2.0 2.7 2.0 1.2  1.0* 
2. Actual earnings per employee hour, annual 
increase, percent 
2.6 2.1 1.6 0.2  0.9* 
3. Wage drift (2. minus 1.), percentage points  +0.6  -0.6  -0.4  -1.0  -0.1* 
Euro area       
1. Collectively agreed wages per employee 
hour, annual increase, percent 
2.6 2.7 2.4 2.1  2.1* 
2. Actual earnings per employee hour, annual 
increase, percent 
4.0 3.3 2.8 2.3  2.3* 
3. Wage drift (2. minus 1.), percentage  points  +1.4 +0.6 +0.4 +0.2 +0.2 
Notes: *Average of first 3 quarters 
Sources: Deutsche Bundesbank (2005), ECB (2006), Statistisches Bundesamt (2005), authors’ calculations 
 
The negative German wage drift is a consequence of fundamental changes in the structure and 
operation of the German collective bargaining system. One clear indicator of this is the 
                                                 
16 See Hein/Schulten/Truger (2006) for a more detailed analysis and further references.   27  
decline in the number of companies and employees covered by collective agreements that has 
been observed since the mid-1990s.
17 The negative wage drift seems to suggest that wage 
increases in companies not bound by collective agreements were significantly lower. 
Furthermore, even within the German collective bargaining system there are numerous 
indicators which suggest that the binding nature of collective agreements is being eroded, 
making negotiated collective wage increases harder to implement in practice. There is now a 
significant number of companies that are formally bound by collective agreements but which 
in practice do not comply with them.
18 In addition to the above, ‘hardship’ and ‘opening-
clauses’ were introduced into virtually all of the major sectoral collective agreements in the 
1990s, allowing companies to deviate from the terms contained in collective agreements 
under certain circumstances.
19 One final significant cause of the negative wage drift is the 
reduction of payments that are above the collectively agreed rate. During the course of the 
1990s, several companies began to use ‘company alliances for jobs’ to ‘compensate for’ the 
wage increases negotiated in collective agreements by cutting back on payments above the 
collectively agreed rate. This has led to the emergence of a new form of concession 
bargaining in which employees agree to give up established benefits in exchange for limited 
job security, thereby contributing to a substantial reduction in labour costs. 
 
High unemployment, weak trade union bargaining power, the erosion of the German wage 
bargaining system, and the recent labour market reforms (AGENDA 2010, ‘Hartz’-laws) have 
increased the risk of deflation for the German economy.
20 In the long run inflation is mainly 
affected by the development of nominal unit labour costs, and in Germany unit labour cost 
growth has been negative in 2004 and 2005. This has not yet triggered actual deflation due 
increasing import prices (crude oil and oil derivatives) and to increasing administered prices.
21 
But it has certainly increased deflationary risks if we take a look at the development at the 
                                                 
17 According to the IAB (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung) figures for 2001, only 48 percent of all 
companies in western Germany and 71 percent of all employees were bound by collective agreements, while in 
eastern Germany the figures were as low as 28 percent of companies and 56 percent of employees (Bispinck 
2003: 395). 
18 According to the results of the 2002 WSI Works Council Survey, which probably only covers part of the 
problem, 10 percent of companies occasionally failed to comply with the terms of current collective agreements, 
and a further 5 percent did so frequently. In the majority of these cases, the non-compliance involved failure to 
pay the collectively agreed wages (Bispinck/Schulten 2003: 159) 
19 Opening-clauses are now used by more than a third of all companies, although it is true that in the majority of 
cases these relate to the divergence of working time organization from the collective agreement, and the use of 
opening-clauses with regard to remuneration is for the time being still not very widespread (Bispinck/ Schulten 
2003: 160). 
20 See the IMF (2003) on deflation risks in Germany. For a more extensive discussion of deflation risks in 
Germany and the Euro area see Hein/Schulten/Truger (2006). 
21 See Bibow (2006a, 2006b) on the relevance of tax-push inflation in Germany and other European countries.   28  
market determined core inflation (Table 8). And this risk threatens to be spreading to the Euro 
area as a whole. Here nominal unit labour cost growth has come down to around 1 percent in 
2004 and 2005, and the market determined core inflation has also declined to close to 1 
percent in 2005. Of course, this development is dominated by the largest Euro area economy, 
Germany. But German wage restraint, the increasing German competitiveness relative to the 
other Euro area countries and hence rising German export surpluses with the rest of the Euro 
area will increase the pressure on the other Euro area countries to reduce wage costs. And 
since the competitive price advantage which German producers have gained during the recent 
decade would be maintained even if unit labour costs in Germany and the rest of the Euro area 
would now start to move in step, this pressure will continue and deflationary risks for the 
Euro area will inevitably have to increase. 
 
Table 8: Unit labour costs and inflation in Germany and the Euro area, 2001-2005 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Germany       
1. Compensation per employee hour, annual 
increase, percent 
2.4 2.1 1.9 0.0 0.8 
2. Productivity per hour, annual increase, 
percent 
1.8 1.5 1.2 0.9 1.5 
3. Nominal unit labour costs growth, percent  0.6  0.6  0.6  -0.8  -0.7 
4. Market determined core inflation
~,  percent  0.7 1.3 0.5 0.8 0.3 











Euro area       
1. Compensation per employee, annual 
increase, percent 
2.7 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.5
#
2. Productivity per employee, annual increase, 
percent 
0.5 0.2 0.5 1.1 0.5
#
3. Nominal unit labour costs growth, percent  2.3  2.2  1.8  0.9  1.1
#
4. Market determined core inflation
~,  percent  1.7 2.2 1.6 1.3 1.1 
5. Inflation rate (HCPI), percent  2.3  2.3  2.1  2.1  2.2
§
Notes: 
#average of first 2 quarters, 
§European Commission (2005) forecast, 
~without energy, food, alcohol, 
tobacco and administered prices according to Bibow (2006a) 
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6. Economic policy conclusions 
 
Since the main cause for Germany’s absolute and relative stagnation can be found in 
macroeconomic mismanagement, the economic policy recommendations seem to be quite 
straight forward: apply more expansive monetary and fiscal policies and stabilising wage 
policies. However, such an approach faces serious institutional problems associated with the 
Maastricht economic policy regime dominating the Euro area: the ECB’s monetary policy 
strategy and practice displaying a serious ‘anti-growth’-bias, the SGP imposing a restrictive 
fiscal stance on the Euro area, and the focus on labour market deregulation which 
systematically undermines the ability of bargaining parties to establish wage settlements with 
an eye to macroeconomic requirements.
22 Under these conditions, the combination of a 
pronounced trend towards stagnation and significant deflation risks caused by overly 
moderate wage developments in the largest Euro area country represents a major challenge: 
 
First, reduction of deflation risks and nominal stabilisation in Germany requires nominal wage 
growth to rise in order to achieve the sum of long-term productivity growth plus the ECB’s 
target inflation rate. However, given the deterioration of the German wage bargaining system 
and the weak bargaining position of the trade unions, an increase in nominal wage and unit 
labour cost growth requires improved employment and higher GDP growth as a precondition. 
But more expansive macroeconomic policies at the national level generating more 
employment are difficult to achieve given the restrictions by the Euro area policy mix, i.e. the 
ECB policies and the SGP. 
 
Second, even if German trade unions – assisted by more expansive fiscal and monetary 
policies – managed to increase nominal wage und unit labour cost growth, and if inflation in 
Germany rose, such a rise would lead to a Euro area inflation rate above the ECB’s target as 
long as other Euro area countries have inflation rates considerably above that target rate. 
Restrictive monetary policies will then be unavoidable if the ECB is not prepared to increase 
its inflation target substantially in order to allow the slowly growing larger economies more 
room to achieve a recovery. 
 
 
                                                 
22 On the Maastricht economic policy regime and European macroeconomic policies see the more extensive 
treatment in Hein/Truger (2005c, 2005d). On the interaction of the ECB’s monetary policy with wage bargaining 
in Europe see Hein (2002).   30  
Third, if the ECB is not prepared to raise its inflation target, it will be necessary to reduce 
inflation in the other Euro area countries in order to allow Germany to have more inflation. It 
is therefore important for the bargaining parties and in particular the trade unions to intensify 
their efforts towards European-level effective coordination of wage policies. The aim of this 
process should be for each country to increase wages on the basis of its long-term domestic 
productivity growth rates plus the ECB’s target inflation rate.
23 There are, however, major 
obstacles for wage bargaining coordination across Europe arising from the different degrees 
of coordination within the national bargaining systems, from the overall weakness of trade 
unions in the larger Euro area countries, from the tendency towards decentralisation of 
bargaining imposed by labour market policies, etc. In addition, reducing inflation in the 
rapidly growing high inflation Euro area countries would mean higher real interest rates and 
lower growth for these countries. 
 
If it proves impossible either to convince the ECB to raise its inflation target or to coordinate 
wage policies across the Euro area in the way described above, even more expansive fiscal 
policies would have to be undermined by restrictive ECB policies. Under these conditions 
Germany’s stagnation and deflation risks will continue to spread to the other Euro area 
countries. Excessive wage restraint in Germany will not only fuel national economic 
stagnation but will also increase the already existing pressure on wage policies in the other 
Euro area countries. If wage policies are widely used to protect or improve price 
competitiveness, then further redistribution at the expense of labour, rising effective demand 
problems and the threat of deflation will spread accordingly. If this happens, then even a more 
growth-friendly monetary policy by the ECB might be ineffective when in the next cyclical 
downturn the deflation risks become actual deflation – in Germany but also in the Euro area 
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